In recent literature on microaggression, various authors argue that the primary harm of microaggression is epistemic: it diminishes the victim’s capacity to make a knowledge claim because she is uncertain of the intention of the microaggressor. In this paper, I first develop an account of the epistemic harm of microaggression: a victim of microaggression knows that the microaggressor may have acted on a prejudice; the threat of this potential prejudice raises the stakes for her to act upon an epistemic belief, meaning the victim may not be able to justify her belief that she was wronged. I argue that repeated exposure to the epistemic harms of microaggression cause cumulative effects that undermine a marginalized subject’s epistemic confidence or belief in her capacity to make knowledge claims. Then, second, I develop what I refer to as the counterfactual account of microaggression: in the absence of microaggression, marginalized subjects may more easily justify their beliefs. Finally, I demonstrate one way in which the harms of microaggression can be mitigated. Marginalized subjects often form communities amongst each other to create spaces where their voices can be heard; I argue that these communities not only help mitigate the epistemic harms of microaggression but provide hope for the marginalized subject by helping her develop the epistemic confidence necessary to respond to future microaggressive events.